Political Voice & Some Thoughts on Free Speech

Today, we heard from three different speakers on three very different subjects: first on the role of social integration and identity in rural France, then on discrimination in the French overseas territories, and finally on the nature of right wing extremist groups in the French political system. It seems to me that one theme that connects all of three of these topics is the theme of political voice; namely, who in French politics is and isn’t allowed or given the space to have a voice.

In the case of the first lecture, Pierre Cornu explained to us the difference between “subject class” and “object class” in the context of the French rural population, the former being a Marxist concept used to describe the working class, engaged in revolutionary struggle and with the ability to act upon or change history, and the latter being a sociological term for a class of people upon which history acts. The fact that French peasants have, for much of France’s history, been part of the “object class,” without political voice or agency—Marx’s “sack of potatoes”—has amplified, I think, the importance of communalism and independence amongst village communities that M. Cornu described this morning.

The second lecture, by Sophie Elizéon, dealt with the relationship between France and her overseas territories and the discrimination faced by residents of these territories. We heard about the terribly unjust policies set up in the 1960s involving the forced immigration of thousands of Reunion Islanders—particularly young children—to departments of France facing urban exodus and an aging population. Once again, one of the central issues in Mme. Elizéon’s talk was one of political voice. The Reunion Islanders who sent their children to France during the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s had very little agency in the process of immigration. Barriers to political involvement such as illiteracy prevented the Reunion Islanders of this era from having a voice in the policies of their territory, and such barriers still pose tremendous problems today.

Our third and final lecture of the day was, to me, the most interesting, because it dealt with an issue that has been on my mind since left-wing student Clement Meric was killed by right-wing extremists last Wednesday in Paris. Jean-Louis Touraine discussed the different right-wing associations and political groups that are currently active in France, which led us to have a very interesting discussion on the lines between free speech, hate speech, and violent action. This is a very challenging subject, especially in the face of such fresh tragedy, and it is one that I have been thinking about for the past year while writing my thesis for my History degree at Yale. My thesis (which is very long and a bit dry, so I won’t share the whole thing with you guys—though I’m happy to share it with anyone who thinks they’re REALLY interested) explored the evolution of free speech and the First Amendment of the Constitution in the United States. Specifically, I was looking at free speech as it related to legal definitions of obscenity during the 1950s and ’60s… Which is neither here nor there, in the context of our discussion this afternoon. I think, though, that it is still important to think about free speech and, more specifically, public morality in the context of these debates about censorship of hate speech and the dissolution of groups associated with hate speech and hateful ideas. While I think hate speech is despicable and agree that it can inspire individuals to commit hate crimes, I think that the preservation of free speech is extremely important in the context of a diverse democracy. In the United States, the First Amendment (which guarantees free speech) wasn’t very important in legal discourse until people began disagreeing on what was appropriate or inappropriate. In the context of obscenity, the Supreme Court of the United States didn’t even attempt to define the term “obscenity” (which had been in use in court cases since the 1830s, and had been used time and time again to justify censorship) until 1957. There hadn’t been a need to define obscenity until the mid-twentieth century, because the enfranchised population of the United States—mostly white, middle- and upper-class men—was pretty much in agreement over what kinds of speech were acceptable and what were not. After 1957, however, it became very apparent that “obscenity” had begun to mean different things to different people, and the Court could no longer justify censorship on the basis of obscenity because it was no longer clear what exactly obscenity was. One person’s obscene book was another’s literary masterpiece. To ban an obscene book is (in the legal history of the U.S.) fine, but to ban a literary masterpiece infringes upon free speech and is an act of tyranny.

Today, France and the United States are both diverse nations. Diversity of opinion means that not everybody is going to agree on what constitutes inappropriate speech; for example, someone who is racist, homophobic, or Islamaphobic is not going to take issue with statements that I would find incredibly bigoted and inappropriate. If I choose to censor their statements, who is to say that they will not, in turn, censor my statements with which they probably will disagree? In a democracy, it is not our responsibility to censor that which we disagree with, but rather it is our responsibility to point out, to engage in debate with, and to denounce those statements and speeches which we find bigoted and wrong. And hopefully, by engaging in this debate and loudly protesting whenever we hear or see something we thing is wrong, we’ll prevent hate from spreading and turning into action.

Those are my two cents on free speech! Have a great night, everyone!